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Abstract 
This paper evaluates whether natural resource export revenue of Mongolia reduces the interest rate spread 
using single-sector model and studies the cases that decreased their interest rate spread successfully. The 
results suggest that the difference in the quality of natural resource’s expenditure is the key factor of 
developing stable economy. As witnessed by the examples of Botswana and Sierra Leone, natural wealth can 
become both of a blessing or a curse depending on the effectiveness of economic and political policies. In 
other words, if Mongolia spends its resource revenue ineffectively, its fame on the international market will be 
lost and leads to be pegged with high interest rate. Finally, the paper suggests some policy recommendations 
for the optimal spending of the windfall revenue based on the result. 
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1 Introduction 
Most developing countries tend to be capital scarce and face an interest rate premium in 
borrowing from international credit markets. It therefore becomes one of the main factors that 
lead these economies to have a stable, high domestic interest rate. 
Mongolian commercial banks’ interest rate is decreasing in recent years, but it is still at the 
high level. In 2012, Mongolia sold its government bond worth 1.5 billion USD on the 
international market. At the trade, 500 million USD, five-year bond was sold at its launch price 
of 4.125% yield and 1 billion USD, 10-year bond was sold at 5.125%. The interest rates of this 
bond are about 4 percent higher than the world interest rate, because of the country risk. Besides, 
Mongolia is a natural resource abundant country with mineral deposits such as Oyu Tolgoi mine 
counted as the largest undeveloped copper and gold reserve in the world, Tavan Tolgoi mine one 
of the biggest coal mines in the world and other big mines of copper, coal, iron and zinc. In 
2009, the Government of Mongolia signed an investment agreement covering the construction 
and operation of a copper, gold mine at Oyu Tolgoi with Ivenhoe Mines Mongolia Inc. In other 
words, Mongolia expects a windfall revenue from its natural resources. 
Several studies, particularly, Frederick and Anthony (2009) have examined the impact of 
windfall revenue on interest rate/risk premium and determined the optimal policy for 
resource-rich countries. As a result of these papers, windfall revenue in a developing economy 
reduces the interest rate spread depend on foreign debt reduction and optimal policy involves 
cutting distortionary taxation in order to raise investment and wages. In theoretical view, a 
country with low foreign debt has a small risk of default and can borrow on international markets 
at the world interest rate. But some some paper suggest empirically that there is a positive 
relationship between exports of some resource-rich economies and their interest rate spread 
(Central bank of Chile, 2002). 
This paper aims to evaluate whether natural resource export revenue of Mongolia reduces the 
interest rate spread using single-sector model and studies the cases that decreased their interest 
rate spread, successfully. 
2 Overview of the Mongolian economy 
2.1 Real sector 
Recently the Mongolian economy has been growing rapidly, about 8.5% year on year, for the last 
8 years. Even though the economy was relatively small with GDP of US$ 1.3 billion in 2000, it 
has increased quickly during the decade and reached US$ 14.4 billion by the end of 2011. 
Figure 1. Mineral and Non-mineral GDP 
 
As the global economic downturn occurred in 2009 economic growth slowed to -1.3%. The most 
suffered sector during the crisis was mineral sector as a result of the copper price decline starting 
from 2007 where the scope of the downturn in mineral GDP growth was very low and its 
contribution to GDP has become almost invisible 2007 to 2008. 
After crisis growth reached 6.4% in 2010 and 17.3% in 2011, which is the highest annual 
growth ever accounted for the last 20 years. Mining sector growth was 3.6% and 8.7% 
respectively in the years mentioned above. 
In terms of expenditure, it is also expected that GDP will grow dramatically as a result of the 
investments made in the mining sector, such as mining related equipment, plant, and fuel in the 
next few years. Even though big mining projects such as Oyu Tolgoi will not come on stream 
until 2013, other small mining projects are likely to increase the country’s production and export. 
Furthermore, this positive trend in the mining sector will provide further growth in demand as 
tax income from the sector supports government expenditures, particularly on social welfare, so 
as the consumption. 
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2.2 Mining sector 
Mongolia is a country with vast natural resources and is heavily dependent on their extraction. 
Especially, copper, gold, coal and uranium are dominant resources. As of 2011, total mineral 
exports were equivalent to about 40% of GDP. The two main export commodities, copper and 
coal currently compose almost 70% of total export earnings. The mining industry in Mongolia is 
expected to grow and develop in the near future, not only because of reserves, but also because 
of its proximity to, and trade with China, which is expected to sustain its growing demand for 
mineral commodities. 
Figure 2. Export shares by commodities Figure 3. Share of Commodities to Export 
  
Similar to other resource dependent countries Mongolian current account is very sensitive from 
international market’s resource price. 
Figure 4. Export shares by countries Figure 5. Commodity Price Indices (2005=100) 
  
Mongolia faces challenges to develop the mining sector responsibility, not only in terms of the 
environment and industry practices, but also economically in order to avoid a widening trade 
deficit and high inflation which could result from rapid economic growth. Also, it will be 
important to consider Chinese mineral policy and mineral needs. 
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Also Oyu Tolgoi and other projects are expected to start out in 2013. However, Mongolian 
mining sector investment mainly focuses on copper, coal and gold, but there are still several 
feasible resources if the government provide infrastructure. 
2.3 Interest rates 
According to “Commercial banks’ interest rate spread in Mongolia” in 2006, as banks’ marginal 
operation cost, risk cost decreases the loan interest rate tends to fall. Major drawing back factor 
to decrease loan interest rate considerably is inefficient competition on loan sources. 
Figure 6. Deposit rate and loan rate in domestic market (2002-2009) 
 
Decrease in the loan interest rate to 18 unit percent played the main role to shorten the spread. In 
2010, Mongolian central bank implemented projects to reduce spread which based complete 
researches on interest rate spread. But according to statistics interest rate have not changes 
seriously. 
Figure 7. Deposit rate and loan rate in domestic market (2009-2012) 
 
Domestic loan and deposit rates are stable around 14.9% and 11.7%. Comparison to the other 
countries is illustrated below. 
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Figure 8. Deposit rate comparison Figure 9. Loan rate comparison 
  
3 Literature review 
In this section, it will briefly discuss three major literature fields, including world and domestic 
framework. 
3.1 Determinants of the interest rates 
The starting point for analyzing the determinants of the deposit interest rate is a model of 
Hannan, Berger (1989, 1991). The deposit base model suggests the optimal deposit interest rate 
to commercial banks. This model also emphasizes competition, growth rate and market share of 
depositary market and other macro indicators which considered to setting up interest rate level. 
The first theoretical model of the optimal spread (loan interest rate – deposit interest rate) 
based on banking financial intermediation activity showed initially by Ho and Saunders (1981) 
which is called “Dealership”, then lately extended having money market’s uncertainty, interest 
risk, and different type of loan and deposit into the model by Mcshane, Sharpe (1985), Allen 
(1988) and Angbanzo (1997). Lately extended by Maudos and Guevara (2004). The model’s 
specialty is to show banking operational risk, operating cost, activity’s size, degree of risk 
aversion and market structure affecting spread. 
According to the literature in Mongolia, Boldbaatar (2006) and Gan-Ochir (2006, 2009) used 
the model mentioned above to define the determinants of Mongolian commercial banks’ interest 
rate and suggested policy options. 
3.2 Natural resources and interest rates 
The main literature that shows the characters of interest rate in resource-rich country is studied 
by Frederick and Anthony (2009). They used simple single-sector model to show the temporary 
windfall decreases the interest rate spread. Then in 2011 they extended dependence of interest 
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rate by resource size options. Also, there are several literatures about interest rate affects 
economic environment by systematically adversely. For example, Edward (1984), Klein (1995) 
and Klein & Barners (1997) confirm economic growth, export and other major variables are 
important determinants of interest rate. Some economists indicate higher capability of lending 
reduce the interest rate spread (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000). 
Also, Martin Uribe and Vivian Z. Yue (2005) determines the relationship between world 
interest rate, domestic interest rate spreads and macroeconomic major variables in developing 
countries. In this article they emphasized several characters. (1) US interest rate shocks explain 
about 20% of movements in aggregate activity in emerging economies. (2) Country spread 
shocks explain about 12% of business cycles in emerging economies. (3) In response to an 
increase in US interest rates, country spreads first fall and then display a large, delayed 
overshooting; (4) US-interest-rate shocks affect domestic variables mostly through their effects 
on country spreads; (5) The feedback from emerging-market fundamentals to country spreads 
significantly exacerbates business-cycle fluctuations. 
In Mongolia, there are several studies concern mining sector impacts on economic 
development but have not done any research concentrated on interest rate. 
3.3 Natural resource curse and Optimal policy 
The mining sector has either positive or negative impacts on economic development. By starting 
the supply of natural resources, the GDP and NI for per capita will probably increase and 
requires to borrow capital and import labor from international market. Moreover, the 
contribution of the mining sector to GDP will increase, dramatically. 
In practice, some countries which had not controlled the one sector’s imbalanced effect to 
economy face big issue to handle single sector dominance. We can sum up studies about the 
adverse effect of the mining sector is called “Dutch disease”, very interesting study field. The 
natural resource curse is a paradox that resource-rich countries’ growth rate is slower than 
natural resource scarce countries (Humphreys et al., 2007). 
For example, tigers of the East Asia (Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) 
maintained very high growth rates from 1960-1990, in contrast resource-rich Latin America 
stagnated or declined (Weinthal and Luong, 2006). The literature in the 1990s and early 2000s 
emphasis that an abundance of natural resource acts as a drag on economic development (Sachs 
and Warner, 1995; Gylfason et al., 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Neumayer, 2004). 
There are several guidances and interpretations to avoid the natural resource curse. The first 
explanation is that resource revenue tends to increase a fight over existing resources, which leads 
to poor institutional quality and lower economic growth. Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) claim 
that the lower growth is generated by the presence of common-pool problems or uncertainty 
related to property rights over the resource income, which leads to inefficiencies in usage of 
existing resources. This is called “institutional impact of natural resources”, some empirical 
evidences claimed that natural resources (in particular, oil and minerals) exert a robust negative 
and nonlinear impact on growth via their harmful impact on institutional quality (Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian, 2003). On the other hand, countries that export fuels, minerals, plantation 
crops, and coffee or cocoa do worse across an array of governance indicators, even when 
controlling for other potential determinants of governance (Isham et al., 2005). 
A second explanation is that resource rents are volatile, due to the low price elasticity of 
natural resource supply. The relationship between the volatility of resource rents and growth 
(Ramey and Ramey, 1995) and investment (education) are negative (Aizenman and Marion, 
1999), (Flug, Spilimbergo, and Wachtenheim, 1998). Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) argue that 
the major cause of this negative effect is the existence of financial market imperfections, as a 
result of which, volatility leads to a higher cost of capital, lower investment, and lower welfare. 
A third explanation is the hypothesis commonly known as “Dutch Disease”. As mentioned 
before Corden (1982) and Corden and Neary (1984) summarized the Dutch Disease hypothesis  
as the notion that an exogenous increase in resource prices or in resource output results in real 
exchange rate appreciation and a decline in the manufacturing sector. 
The assumption of the “Dutch Disease” model following Corden and Neary (1984), differs a 
resource movement effect from a spending effect. The production output decline is up to “direct 
de-industrialization.” While the price of manufacturing goods is constant, the decline in services 
output leads to excess demand for services and therefore to an increase in the price of services. 
The result is an increase in the price of non-tradable relative to tradable, via an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. 
It is important to emphasize the spending effect than a movement effect of resource in 
developing countries. The resource movement effect only occurs if factors are sufficiently 
mobile between the mining and non-mining sectors, which is unlikely in Mongolia given that the 
mining sector employs relatively few workers and labor mobility is low in general. However, the 
spending effect happens regardless of whether the mining sector employs any labor at all. The 
spending effect occurs simply because higher oil prices generate higher wages and/or profits in 
the mining sector, thus raising aggregate demand in the economy. 
The tendency of volatility is one of the main reasons of the slower growth rate led by 
de-industrialization. Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) spotted that the smaller the manufacturing 
sector, the more difficult it is for the economy to absorb shocks. If there is no manufacturing 
sector, economy will turn to only one employer who represents service sector. Moreover, shocks 
will have to be absorbed by expenditure switching and increased unemployment, implying 
increased volatility. As argued above, lower the growth rate slower to change imperfect financial 
markets. However, it does not explain why growth would be permanently lower. That is why 
manufacturing sector has not rebuilt during times of low commodity prices. 
But recent literatures prove that there is a chance to turn the natural resource curse 
(Sub-Saharan, Latin American countries) into blessing (Chile, Botswana, Nigeria and Austria). 
Only interpretation of the arising resource curse is non optimal policy. Furthermore, inefficient 
policy is caused by low institutional quality, bad governance and slow development. In other 
word, by improving quality of institution we can deserve positive effect of natural resource 
(Collier and Goderis, 2008). 
4 Single-sector model of the resource-rich country 
4.1 Benchmark model 
In this section, we will consider the relationship between interest rate and windfall revenue. First, 
in an open small economy, we assume that domestic interest rate and world interest rate are 
equal. So that the country can lend infinitely from the world capital market. This economy has 
exogenous and constant non-resource output 𝑌. Consumers have no assets and simply receive a 
lump-sum transfer or citizen dividend 𝑇 from the government so their consumption is 𝐶 = 𝑌 +
𝑇. 
Only the government can access international capital market, foreign debt represents national 
debt. If temporary windfall comes to the economy, the foreign debt function change can be 
written as below. 
?̇? = 𝑟 ∗ 𝐹 + 𝐺 + 𝑇 − 𝑁 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝐹 + 𝐺 + 𝐶 − 𝑌 − 𝑁 (1) 
Where 𝐹 foreign debt, 𝐺 government expenditure, 𝐶 consumption, 𝑇 transfer to household 
and 𝑁 windfall. According to the permanent income hypothesis, when anticipated windfall 
occurs small open economy responds as Figure 10. Where 𝑁𝑃  permanent income, 𝑁 
anticipated temporary windfall’s function. 
𝑇, 𝐺 government total expenditure 𝑟 ∗ 𝐹0 debt service. The flow of revenue is announced at 
date of 𝑡 = 0 which we refer to as the date of extraction and ceases flowing, or is depleted, at 
some later date. 
Permanent resource revenue 𝑁𝑝 rises as the date of extraction comes closer, and falls once 
extraction begins, going to zero when the windfall ends. Which means paying off foreign debt. If 
the country’s initial debt is 𝐹0 flow cost of debt service is 𝑟 ∗ 𝐹0. As paid off all debt by 
windfall revenue, country should build up SWF to keep on earning a permanent income. 
Eventually government overall expenditure will agree with the interest rate revenue of SWF. 
Figure 10. Use of Sovereign Wealth Fund to manage temporary windfall revenue according to the 
permanent income hypothesis 
 
In summary, the permanent income hypothesis suggests that the country runs a current-account 
deficit when it anticipates future windfall revenue, then pays off foreign debt and builds a SWF 
by running a current-account surplus during the temporary windfall. Total spending (public 
consumption plus citizen dividends) increases immediately upon news of the windfall. The 
foreign assets that are built up at the end of the windfall generate just sufficient interest revenue 
to finance the permanent rise in public spending. This policy of borrowing, then saving and 
finally living of the return on the SWF, thus transforms an anticipated, temporary windfall 
revenue into a permanent increase in aggregate spending, where the amount devoted to citizen 
dividends and private consumption decreases with the weight given to public consumption. 
We have to consider the assumption that the domestic interest rate is equal to world interest 
rate. Unfortunately, most developing countries face higher domestic interest rate due to scarcity 
of capital. Thus, developing countries have higher domestic interest rate, lower infrastructure 
investment, income per capita and wage. We assumed that the interest rate premium depends 
positively on the national debt. Empirical evidence is plotted in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Interest rate spreads and “public and publicly guaranteed debt” 
 
According to the relationship between the interest rate spread and public debt we can obtain 
following equation. 
𝑟 =  𝑟∗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹 ≤  ?̅? 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑟 =  𝑟∗ + 𝛱(𝐹) >  𝑟∗𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐹 >  ?̅?  ≥  0 (2) 
Where, Π(𝐹) is the interest rate premium and ?̅? is the debt threshold. Below from ?̅?, the 
country is a price taker at the world rate of interest. And 𝛱(?̅?) =  𝛱′(?̅?) =  0 and 𝛱′(𝐹)  >  0,
𝐹 >  ?̅?  ≥  0 in other word premium function is positively related to debt and at the threshold 
debt the premium is equal to zero. Figure 12 portrays supply schedule from the international 
capital market. 
Figure 12. The cost of foreign borrowing 
 
Turnovsky (1997) and other economists declare that the supply schedule of foreign debt slopes 
upwards for all (𝐹) in open small economy. For steady state debt equal to threshold debt 
(?̅?) and the domestic interest rate agrees with world interest rate (𝑟∗). 
4.2 Single-sector model of developing country 
To see the windfall effect on economic major variables, specially on interest rate, we considered 
a simple model which ignored absorbing expenditure, an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and its adverse impact on the traded sector or from supply bottlenecks in particular domestic 
sectors such as construction. Also, there is no market failure and uncertainty. The economy has 
non-resource sector, which consists of government driven public and foreign-owned private 
sectors. 
4.2.1 Household 
The most developing countries are capital scarce. So household will receive income from wage 
and government transfer. The government will smooth consumption by adjusting lump sum tax 
and transfer. 
Household utility function, 
𝑈 = ∫ ((𝐶1−1 𝜎⁄ + 𝜓𝐺1−1 𝜎⁄ ) (1 − 1 𝜎⁄ )⁄ )
∞
0
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜌𝑡)𝑑𝑡 (3) 
𝐶  consumption, 𝐺  government expenditure, 𝜌  time preference and 𝜎  intertemporal 
substitution coefficient. To finance the government expenditure and transfer, government will 
borrow 𝐷 from the international capital market. 
?̇? = 𝑟𝐷 + 𝐺 + 𝐼𝑠 + 𝑇 − 𝜏𝑌 − 𝑁 (4) 
As stated above government debt depends on the domestic interest rate   r , government 
expenditure 𝐺, investment on public sector 𝐼𝑠, transfer 𝑇, tax rate 𝜏, and windfall income 𝑁. 
Analysis is simplified by working with net government assets defined as the stock of public 
infrastructure minus government debt. 
𝐵 = 𝑆 − 𝐷 (5) 
The budget constraint is 
?̇? = 𝑟(𝐵 − 𝑆) + 𝑁 + 𝜏 ∗ 𝑌 − 𝐺 − 𝑇 − 𝛿𝑠𝑆 
𝐵(0) = 𝐵0 
(6) 
The initial value of net government assets is fixed at 𝐵0. 
The no-Ponzi game condition must be satisfied so initial net government assets plus the 
present value of the stream of future income taxes and resource revenue must cover the present 
value of the stream of future spending on public consumption, government transfers and 
infrastructure services. 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑡→∞
𝐵(𝑡) 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (− ∫ 𝑟(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
𝑡
0
) = 0 (7) 
Using a utility function and budget constraint, the Pontryagin function will be defined as follows: 
𝐻(𝜏, 𝑇, 𝐺, 𝑆, 𝜇) ≡ (
[𝑊(𝑆, 𝜏) + 𝑇]1−1 𝜎⁄ + 𝜓𝐺1−1 𝜎⁄
1 − 1 𝜎⁄
)
+ 𝜇[{𝑟∗ + 𝛱(𝑆 − 𝐵)}(𝐵 − 𝑆) + 𝑁 + 𝜏𝑌(𝑆, 𝜏) − 𝐺 − 𝑇 − 𝛿𝑆𝑆] 
(8) 
The first order conditions: 
𝐻𝜏 = 𝐶
−1 𝜎⁄ 𝑊𝜏 + 𝜇(𝑌 + 𝜏𝑌𝜏) = 0 (8.1) 
𝐻𝑇 = 𝐶
−1 𝜎⁄ − 𝜇 = 0 (8.2) 
𝐻𝐺 = 𝜓𝐺
−1 𝜎⁄ − 𝜇 = 0 (8.3) 
𝐻𝑆 = 𝐶
−1 𝜎⁄ 𝑊𝑆 + 𝜇[𝜏𝑌𝑆 − {𝑟
∗ + 𝛱(𝐷) + 𝐷𝛱′(𝐷) + 𝛿𝑆}] (8.4) 
𝑟∗𝜇 − ?̇? = 𝐻𝐵 = 𝜇[𝑟
∗ + 𝛱(𝐷) + 𝐷𝛱′(𝐷)] (8.5) 
If the government can make lump-sum transfers to consumers, then it is optimal to set the 
income tax rate at zero. From that from (8.1) and (8.2) together with 𝑊𝜏 = −𝑌 condition 
satisfies. The optimal level of public consumption follows from (8.2) and (8.3) as 𝐺 = 𝜓𝜎𝐶. 
As satisfying first order conditions 
𝑊𝑆(𝑆, 0) = 𝑟
∗ + Π(𝐷) + 𝐷Π′(𝐷) + 𝛿𝑆 (8.4’) 
The optimal path of consumption: 
 𝐷 > ?̅?,  ?̇? = 𝜎𝐶[Π(𝐷) + 𝐷Π′(𝐷)] 
(8.5’) 
?̇? = 0 
Hence, in a capital-scarce economy the optimal consumption paths are tilted towards the future 
to redeem government debt, lower the interest rate, boost public and private capital accumulation 
and thus spur the process of economic development. 
4.2.2 Firm 
Non-resource production function is defined as follows, depends on labor, which is normalized, 
private capital 𝐾 , public infrastructure 𝑆  and standardized technological advance 𝐴 . The 
production function satisfies neoclassic production function’s properties. 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼𝑆𝛾 (9) 
We are including infrastructure, education, health and other things in public stock. Government 
controls public sector and foreigners own private capital sector. They can reach a world capital 
market at world interest rate  𝑟∗ and pays 𝜏 fraction of their income to the government as 
income taxation. 
Profit maximization condition in private sector: 
(1 − 𝜏)𝑓𝑘(𝐾, 𝑆) = 𝑟
∗ + 𝛿𝑘 (10) 
As we see profit maximization condition private capital depends on public stock and taxation 
portion  𝐾 = 𝐾(𝑆, 𝜏). Thus we can find wage and output as below. 
𝑊(𝑆, 𝜏) = (1 − 𝜏)[𝑓(𝐾(𝑆, 𝜏), 𝑆) − 𝐾(𝑆, 𝜏)𝑓𝑘(𝐾(𝑆, 𝜏), 𝑆)] 
(11) 
𝑌(𝑆, 𝜏) = 𝑓(𝐾(𝑆, 𝜏), 𝑆) 
And we draw transitional mechanism of the single-sector model in Figure 13 by using Vensim 
program. 
Figure 13. Transmission mechanism of the model 
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4.3 Parameter calibration 
The parameters of the model are calibrated to the Mongolian economy based on the existing 
literature. 
Table 1. Calibration 
Descriptions Parameters Values 
Private capital contribution to output 𝛼 0.40 
Public stock contribution to output 𝛾 0.25 
World interest rate 𝑟∗ 0.05 
Time preference parameter 𝜌 0.05 
Intertemporal substitution elasticity 𝜎 0.75 
Private capital depreciation 𝛿𝑘 0.05 
Public sector depreciation 𝛿𝑝𝑢𝑏 0.05 
Debt threshold  ?̅? = ?̅? 0.00 
Government expenditure 𝐺 0.00 
Income tax rate 𝜏 0.00 
Population growth 𝑛 0.00 
Technological advance 𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 1.00 
4.4 Simulation 
In this section, the calibrated model is used to analysis the effect of an increase in windfall 
revenue to the economy. 
Solid lines in Figure 14 are the major economic variables’ path of no shock and dashed line 
indicates temporary anticipated small windfall. The economy starts out at national wealth, 𝐵0 
and with positive initial debt. Thus, the economy smoothly converges to its stationary state by 
accumulating assets, decumulating foreign debt, falling domestic interest rate and rising income 
and consumption. The windfall effect equal to 8% of long run output. To simplify model, we 
assumed threshold as zero. The effect of windfall is divided into three sections. First period is 
between announcement of resource deposit to extraction (period 0 to 6). According to permanent 
income assumption consumption will increase, so transfer and consumption will jump upward. 
But the overall transfer is negative because the economy can’t finance public infrastructure. 
Thus, they have to finance it by borrowing from foreign and debt will flatten. Following higher 
domestic interest rate and lower public, private capital and non-resource income. Second period 
is between extraction to depletion of resources (from the period 7 to 11). Revenue flow reduces 
debt rapidly and decreases premium and increases non-resource sector, wage and consumption. 
Figure 14. Temporary Windfall revenue and lump-sum transfers 
 
Finally, after depleting resource, optimal use of the windfall involves increased consumption 
from the date at which the resource is discovered, and faster asset accumulation (debt 
decumulation) from the date windfall revenue flows. Higher public and private investment brings 
forward the economy’s development path. 
5 Quality of the natural resource allocation 
5.1 Interest rate in natural resource abundant country 
In the previous section we showed theoretically how to create a rapid economic growth by 
decreasing interest rate strongly because of natural resource. However, from the experiences of 
resource-rich countries, the interest rate premium increases while the exports of mining products 
increases.  
Frederick and Anthony (2009) studied the relevance between natural resource and interest 
rate premium and defined it using a logarithm average of interest rate premium of 25 countries’ 
and the size of the natural resource revenue in the GDP shown in Figure 15. 
Public capital stock 
Figure 15. Relationship between interest rate spread and natural resource 
 
From Figure 15, one can see the positive relevance between natural resource and interest rate 
premium which high interest rate remains while natural resource export increases through 
observed countries. Thus, it conflicts with our previous single-sector model results. Therefore, it 
is possibly because of the management of the natural resource revenue, and we introduce natural 
resource optimal policies in the following sections. 
5.2 Possible channels of resource curse 
There are a number of explanations of the abundant natural resource tends to decrease economic 
growth. The most valid ones are direct economy definition or non-effective macroeconomic 
policies and political economic definition or unsuccessful institutions. 
5.2.1 Dutch disease 
The Dutch disease is often described as the main effect of the mining sector on the overall 
economic development. According to Weinthal and Loung (2006), in economy the Dutch disease 
occurs through the excessive amount of revenue from the sudden increase of natural resource 
exports. This flow of revenue leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Also production 
factors, labor and capital, make movement to non-tradable developing sectors - retail trade, 
services and construction. Thus, the effect of real exchange rate appreciation and labor force 
movement reduces the competitive ability of agriculture and other industrial sectors. 
Without appropriate macroeconomic policies, an increase in the demand of labor and capital 
in the services and construction sectors tends to accelerate domestic inflation. So these 
short-term macro changes affect the country’s economic growth by decreasing economic 
diversity. This makes the country’s exports, government income and labor more dependable on 
the only mining sector. Thus the economy, which is dependent from one sector gets more 
fluctuant since the price of commodity products is cyclical. 
Definitions of the negative impact of mining sector dependency on the economy distinguish 
the effect of related economic structural changes, particularly in the industrial sector. 
Particularly, when the size of the industrial sector in aggregate economy declines both demand 
and supply of skilled employee simultaneously decrease and therefore the country’s human 
capital lowers. In addition, it is controversial that having abundant natural resource tends to 
supplant education and training. Recent studies have identified that the reverse relation between 
the public expenditure on education relative to national income, school enrollment and natural 
resource abundance. But it hasn’t yet observed in countries such as Australia. 
Other definitions concentrate on government policies to invest in specific sectors or projects 
and protect non-resource sectors that are in recession, weakened by the resource boom (Stevens, 
2003). Subsidies that protect non-mining sectors from international competition, or purpose of 
improving competitiveness, does aggravate the matter in the medium term because they reduce 
the incentive to remain competitive. Moreover, protecting other tradable sectors in the same way 
is highly expensive (Gregory, 1976; Crowley and Martin, 1982; Parmenter, 1986; Centre for 
International Economics, 2003; Econtech, 2003; Productivity Commission, 2008). The cost of 
such protection becomes financially unsustainable when the sudden growth of the mining sector 
disappears and a country’s natural resource profit decreases. There are several countries such as 
Bolivia, Guyana, Chile (temporarily), Zambia, Zaire and Congo applied this protection strategy 
and failed (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). 
There are a number of cases that many countries failed to reach the main purpose of granting 
subsidies, and main reasons of the failure are that the most countries invested in the military, in 
projects that offered very low rates of return and also invested in capital intensive industries 
rather than labor intensive manufacturing industries better suited to the production capability of a 
country. In 1970, Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resource boom created many problems (Shaxson, 
2005). For instance, in Nigeria, the Ajaokuta steel plant, which built in 1979 for several billion 
dollars, did not produce any steel in 25 years. In 1975-1983, Nigerian capacity utilization in the 
manufacturing sector fell from 77 per cent to 50 per cent, then to 35 per cent by the mid-1980s. 
In other words, two thirds of investment in the manufacturing sector, mostly financed by the 
government, has been wasted. 
5.2.2 Revenue volatility and borrowing 
As discussed above, the strong dependence of a country on the natural resources sector resulting 
from Dutch diseaseintensifies the cyclical nature of economic growth. The particular example is 
government revenue. 
The government income volatility has three main reasons – rate of extraction varies over 
time, time variability of payment and price fluctuations of natural resources. Furthermore, it is 
possible that income volatility depends on political instability,  conflict and concentration of 
exports. This concentration can increase the fiscal balance fluctuation and decrease the terms of 
trade sharply. 
For example, copper ore is Mongolia’s main export and in the past Erdenet mine constituted 
about one quarter of government income. During the 2009 global financial crisis, the copper 
price fall contracted Mongolian economy by 1.6 percent which reached 8.9 percent in 2008. 
Variable earnings increases instability of government income and thus it is difficult to make 
decision in the long run. Adjustments in fiscal expenditure restrain private investment and 
disturb the government budget. Moreover, even fiscal expenditure is stable at a certain level, it is 
hard for governments to make budget cuts (Weinthal and Luong, 2006). During the bust, 
governments often borrow rather than lowering their spending and in the process governments 
owe large amount of debts. 
Bolivia is one of the countries that have been caught in such debt trap. During 1979-1983, 
Bolivia’s real exchange rate doubled, thus non-mining sectors’ became uncompetitve and their 
share of exports decreased suddenly (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). Bolivia protected its 
manufacturing sector, produced uncompetitive products and the efficiency of new investments 
was low. Also the most part of the natural resource income was spent on consumption rather than 
investing. 
Excessive borrowing occurs also during booms not only during busts. There are many 
examples of countries that followed the strategy of borrowing based on their natural resources. 
During 1970s, when commodity prices were high, developing countries were able to borrow 
from the international capital markets. After that in the 1980s, when prices start to fall, those 
countries became unable to pay their debts. 
5.2.3 Policy failures 
As mentioned before mining sector development leads to an economic damages by Dutch 
disease and has negative effects on the economy through wrong policies - inefficient investment, 
trade barriers and rent seeking. By sudden export growth, the government increases its 
investment expenditures on noneffective projects that politicians offered. Trinidad and Tobago is 
an example of a country faced difficulties of lowering subsidies when GDP growth was negative 
in 1981 (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). 
Generally, sudden growth of natural resources tends to create rent seeking (Dietz et al., 
2004). Thus the technological development and labor skill decreases. Sub-Saharan Africa is a 
region with excess bureaucracies and rapidly increasing civil service salaries (Shaxson, 2005). In 
sub-Saharan Africa, national oil companies and state-owned companies, that were built in the 
boom years, encourages the powerful political groups in order to protect their economic interests. 
Beside the direct cost of noneffective investments and subsidy programs, these policies 
spirals inflation and reduce private saving and investment indirectly. In fact, there is a strong 
statistical relation between investment and saving rates (Dietz et al., 2004). 
Gylfason and Zoega (2002) and Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) demonstrated a phenomenon, 
abundant resource leads a country to unstable consumption surplus in the future and GDP growth 
decline, using panel data of a large number of countries. 
5.2.4 Political-economic explanations 
The policy failures defined earlier prove that country’s institution and governance are vitally 
important for defining development path. The impacts of the many harmful economic policies 
such as excessive consumption and borrowing, a failure to invest in human capital and 
value-adding infrastructure, and misguided government intervention have been well-studied for 
the recent years. 
Now there is a widespread acceptance of the institution and its functioning are strongly 
related to natural resource, economic policies  and economic performance (Murshed, 2004). 
Therefore, good institution is possibly related to good economic performances such as savings, 
investments and economic growth (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). 
There are many channels showing that bad institution leads to a resource curse and below is 
the summary (Boschini, 2007). 
 Rent seeking and corruption 
 Institutional malfunctioning 
 Existence of conflict 
The researchers accept that governance, including property right, contract and law enforcement, 
the rule of law and administrative capacity is crucial to determining natural resource effects on 
the economic development. For example, according to Ahmed (2008) following 
politic-economic factors Australia to avoid the resource curse: 
 High responsibility of government and public service 
 Well-defined property rights, strong legal and other institutions and low corruption 
 Relatively low domestic and international conflict over natural resources 
5.3 Policy solutions against resource curse 
Number measures have been proposed and adopted by countries to deal with the commodity 
cycle (Davis, et al., 2003 and Sachs, 2007). 
5.3.1 Stabilizing institutional failure 
Although, many institutions have been implemented to reduce the impact of global market 
volatility on producer countries, most of them have failed and have had a negative effect to the 
economy. 
A. Marketing boards 
Marketing boards are systems, requiring that all sales of commodity products go through the 
government. The purpose of the marketing board is to stabilize the price of commodities. When 
world price is low, the government creates stock by purchasing from exporters and when the 
price gets higher, the government starts spending. Unfortunately, the stabilization process turned 
out to taxation of the agriculture sector and subsidization of the industrial sector. So the 
marketing boards failed because the industrialization did not occur and the agricultural sector 
shrank. 
B. Other government stockpiles/reserves 
In some countries, the government maintains stockpiles/reserves under national security, such as 
the American Strategic Petroleum Reserve. One drawback is that there was a political influence 
on the government decisions of resource management. It also has effects of decreasing incentives 
of private citizen’s reservation. 
C. Producer subsidies 
In developed economies the primary producing sector has some political power and the reserves 
mainly perform as a subsidy rather than taxation. For example, in Germany, the coal miners get 
subsidies, in the United States oil companies pay preferential rents. 
D. Price controls for consumers 
Developing countries aim to protect consumers from the increase in the prices of food and 
energy by political forces. Export controls are the main policy tools for the crop or mineral 
producer country. But this can increase prices in the international trade. 
E. OPEC and other international associations/cartels 
Logically, producer countries should cooperate in order to raise the price level or decrease price 
volatility. Most attempts forming international associations failed within a few years. Although, 
the only association endured is OPEC, the attempt of reducing price fluctuation or increasing 
average price level remains uncertain. 
5.3.2 Devices to share risks from price fluctuations 
In this part we examine the macroeconomic policies to minimize the medium-term fluctuation 
costs associated with the Dutch Disease, and micro economic policies to minimize the risks from 
short-term price fluctuations of commodity.  
There are three promising approaches for avoiding the short-term volatility risks. Firstly 
commodity producers who sign contracts with foreign companies, secondly producers that do 
their own selling, and thirdly the government dependent on commodity revenues. 
A. Price setting in contracts with foreign companies 
Price setting in contracts with foreign companies is often encounters dynamic inconsistency 
problem (Helm, 2010). At first the price is set by, but after world price increases, the government 
wants to renege. Because government doesn’t want to give all the profits to the company and 
gives strong political pressures. 
But it is a “repeated game”, this government renegotiation lowers the interest in investments 
to the foreign companies and can have large transaction costs, such as interruptions in the export 
flow. 
It has become familiar now, it is necessary to make a contract dependent on future terms to 
avoid this inconsistency (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz, 2007). Indexation is important for 
apportioning the risks of gains and losses and renegotiation costs. 
B. Hedging in commodity futures markets 
Commodity producers sell their commodities on international markets and thus face the risk of a 
rise or fall in the dollar price of export. Usually commodity producers can hedge the risk by 
selling on the forward or futures market. Hedging eliminates the additional costs of renegotiation 
when world price changes abruptly. 
C. Denomination of debt in terms of commodity prices 
The government or mineral-producing company to index its debt to the price of the commodity is 
never used before. The balance of payments crisis would not have happened if the debts had 
been indexed to the commodity prices for Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria and Russia. 
It is true that a market needs a certain level of liquidity, the usual answer for why commodity 
producing countries haven’t tried to index their bonds or loans to the price of export commodity 
is that there would not be sufficient demand. 
5.3.3 Monetary policy 
In the previous sections, we discussed institutions for risks of short-term price volatility, this 
time we will consider macroeconomic managements of medium-term volatility. We begin with 
monetary and exchange rate policy to manage the Dutch disease. 
A. Managed floating exchange rates 
Both fixed and floating exchange rates have their advantages. The main advantages of fixed 
exchange rate are that it reduces the costs of international trade and it is a nominal anchor for 
monetary policy which helps the central bank achieve low-inflation credibility. The main 
advantage of floating exchange rate for a commodity producer is that it often provides automatic 
accomodation of terms of trade shocks. 
Therefore an intermediate exchange rate regime such as managed floating or a target zone is 
appropriate for the middle-size and middle-income countries. In the booming decade that began 
in 2001 many followed the intermediate regime, in between a few commodity producers in the 
floating corner (Chile and Mexico) and a few in the firmly fixed corner (Gulf oil producers, 
Ecuador). 
It is vitally important for developing countries, institutions tend to have lower credibility than 
in developed countries, that the public expectations of inflation be anchored by some nominal 
target by which the central bank asks to be judged. If the exchange rate is not to be the nominal 
target, then some other anchor variables should be chosen. 
B. Alternative nominal anchors 
In the past, there were three factors that stabilize the nominal anchors. They are: price of gold 
from the 19th century gold standard, money supply, the choice of monetarists and national 
income. 
For small and open countries, Central bankers considered Inflation Targeting to be the 
preferred approach to fixed exchange rates. However, Inflation Targeting has a particular 
disadvantage for commodity producing countries which is not robust with respect to changes in 
the terms of trade. Fall in world market conditions for the export commodity, it has a negative 
impact on both the balance of payments and the level of economic activity. Loosening monetary 
policy would boost net foreign demand and restore external and internal balance. 
The proposal of keeping the local-currency price of the export commodity stable has pointed 
out before and it moderates swings in the real value of export revenue, expressed in terms of 
purchasing power over domestic goods and services, it would reduce the tendency for 
governments to increase spending excessively in boom times and symmetrically cut it in busts. 
The proposal has the disadvantage of fully transferring the burden of exogenous fluctuations in 
world commodity prices to variability in domestic prices of non-commodity exports, if the 
non-commodity export sector is not small, or if policy-makers want it to become larger. 
However, the important point of this proposal is to include export commodities in the index and 
exclude import commodities, whereas the CPI does it the other way around. 
5.3.4 Institutions to make national saving procyclical 
Some of the most important ways to cope with the commodity cycle are institutions to insure that 
export earnings are put aside during the boom time, into a commodity saving fund, perhaps with 
the aid of rules governing the cyclically adjusted budget surplus. 
A. Reserve accumulation by central banks 
Through foreign exchange intervention, central banks accumulate international reserves during 
booms in order to spend in busts. But holding the assets in the form of foreign exchange reserves 
has few disadvantages: the reserves do not earn a high return, increases in reserves can lead to 
rapid monetary expansion. Thus a central bank that already has enough reserves should consider 
selling some of the foreign exchange to the country’s Natural Resource Fund. But if the Central 
Bank has political independence and the NRF does not, that may be a reason to leave the 
reserves where they cannot be raided. 
B. Budget deficit rules: The Example of Chile 
In June 2008, the Chilean President Michele Bachelet, and Finance Minister Andres Velasco, 
resisted intense pressure to spend the soaring receipts from copper exports, which widely 
resented public. However, one year later, in 2009, when copper prices fell abruptly the 
government increased spending sharply, using the assets that it had acquired during the copper 
boom, and thereby moderating the downturn. Saving for a rainy day made the president and 
minister heroes. Chile has achieved what few commodity-producing developing countries have 
achieved: a truly countercyclical fiscal policy. 
There are several rules of Chilean fiscal policy, such as targeting the overall budget surplus -- 
originally set at 1% of GDP, then lowered to 0.5% of GDP, and again to 0 in 2009. But those 
attempts have failed, because they are too rigid to allow the need for deficits in recessions, 
counterbalanced by surpluses in good times. 
Circumstances that Chilean government can run a deficit larger than the target are: 
 Output falls from the potential, in a recession, or 
 The price of copper is below its medium-term (10-year) equilibrium, 
with the key institutional innovation that there are two sides of experts whose job it is each 
mid-year to make the judgments, respectively, what is the output gap and what is the medium 
term equilibrium price of copper. As the expert panel ruled that most of the price increase was 
temporary, so that most of the earnings had to be saved in the copper boom of 2003-2008, when, 
as usual, the political pressure was to declare the increase in the price of copper permanent 
thereby justifying spending on a par with export earnings, the fiscal surplus reached almost 9% 
and the country paid down its debt to a mere 4% of GDP and it saved about 12% of GDP in the 
sovereign wealth fund. This allowed a substantial fiscal reduction in the recession of 2008-09, 
when the stimulus was most extremely needed. 
Commodity-producing countries could usefully apply variants of the Chilean fiscal device. 
Given that many developing countries are more prone to weak institutions, the principle of a 
separation of decision-making powers should be retained: the rules as interpreted by the panels 
determine the total amount of spending or budget deficits, while the elected political leaders 
determine how that total is allocated. 
C. Commodity Funds or Sovereign Wealth Funds: Sao Tome and Principe 
Many natural resource producers have Commodity Funds, to invest savings for future welfare, 
often in global portfolios. However, it has been pointed out that the commodity fund does not 
necessarily do anything to ensure that politicians will not raid the fund when it is flush. As the 
Norwegian State Petroleum Fund (now called the Norwegian Pension Fund), there should be 
some standard recommendations - the funds are transparent and professionally run, and that they 
be given clear instructions that politics should not interfere with their objective of maximizing 
the financial well being of the country. The commodity fund of Sao Tome and Principe 
established in 2004, also includes extensive restrictions, managing how the oil revenues are to be 
saved, invested, or spent. There can be advantages in spending the commodity funds for 
education, health, or retirement support for a future generation. Humphreys and Sandhu (2007) 
recommend that spending goes through the regular budget in order to avoid any politician’s 
private interest. 
D. Lump sum distribution: Example of Alaska 
By Alaska’s state law the Alaska Permanent Fund saves earnings from the state’s oil sector, must 
equally distribute half of the investment earnings on a per capita basis. The idea is that the 
citizens know how to spend their money better than their government. This system gives 
Alaskans a sense that they are the Fund stakeholders. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
suggest that Nigeria should also distribute its oil earnings on an equal per capita basis. 
E. Reducing net private capital inflows during booms 
Other ways of reducing balance of payments surplus and facilitating national saving, when 
foreign exchange reserves are piling up to high levels are (i) the government deliberately to pay 
the short-term debt, (ii) remove any remaining controls on the ability of domestic citizens to 
invest abroad, and (iii) place controls on short-term capital inflows. 
F. Efforts to impose external checks: Example of Chad 
As in some countries if the executives ignore the law and spend what they want, all these 
institutions can fail. The investment agreement on a new oil pipeline between Chad and the 
World Bank in 2000 stipulated that Chad would spend 72 per cent of its oil export earnings on 
poverty, such as health, education and road-building, and save 10 percent in a “future 
generations fund.” Reflected in the agreement ExxonMobil was to deposit the oil revenues in an 
escrow account at Citibank and the government was to spend them subject to oversight by an 
independent committee. However, the government, one of the two most corrupt in the world, 
reneged on the agreement when money started to come in. Perhaps it may be that 
well-intentioned politicians spend oil wealth quickly out of fear that their successors will 
misspend whatever is left. It is important that international oil companies commit to make known 
how much they pay governments for oil, so that the public at least has a way of knowing when 
large sums disappear. Such legal mechanisms adopted by Sao Tome and Principe void contracts 
if information relating to oil revenues is not made public. 
6 Conclusion 
However, the interest rate of Mongolian commercial banks is declining relatively stable in recent 
years, it is still at a high level. This becomes a restricting factor to get opportunities of low cost 
and long-run financing. One of the solutions for this problem is to accumulate assets from the 
global market, which is not a popular experience in Mongolia. 
The possibility of accumulating additional financing based on their natural resources is 
always open for countries that have abundant resources such as Mongolia. According to the 
literature, Frederick and Anthony (2005) studied that for resource-rich country the rapid increase 
of commodity exports decreases interest rate of its bond in the international markets. Also, 
Martin Uribe and Vivian Z. Yue (2005) examined the relationship between world interest rate, 
country spreads, and economic condition across developing countries. Unfortunately, this field of 
study is totally neglected in Mongolia. Theoretically, abundant natural resource is a condition to 
lower the interest rate premium with high speed, however, natural resource abundant developing 
country cases illustrate that this relationship has not been observed. In other words, spread did 
not fall or it was still at a high level when the mining sector revenue grows excessively. 
The tendency of those countries to spend the resource revenue inefficiently, thus lose their 
opportunity to develop the economy and credibility in the world market is mostly the main 
reason of this phenomenon. 
Mongolia has accumulated substantial capital based on large mining projects such as Oyu 
Tolgoi, Tavan Tolgoi, and expects windfall revenue from this sector in the future. Thus, the 
urgent problem is to define the optimal spending policy of mining sector revenue. 
In this paper, we tried to determine whether a resource exporting revenue of Mongolia 
reduces its interest spread by using single-sector model and suggest the macro prudential policy 
to spend its mining sector revenue optimally based on the experiences of resource blessed 
countries. 
As a result, we emphasize policy failure of resource-rich countries and recommend the 
solutions to divide risks related to world commodity price volatility, appropriate monetary policy 
regime for resource-rich countries, institutions to make national saving procyclical, and efforts to 
impose external checks. In particular: 
1. Include in contracts with foreign purchasers clauses for automatic adjustment of the price 
if world market conditions change. 
2. Hedge export proceeds in commodity futures markets. 
3. Denominate debt in terms of commodity prices. 
4. Allow some nominal currency appreciation in response to an increase in world prices of 
the commodity, but also add to foreign exchange reserves, especially at the early stages of 
the boom when it may prove to be transitory. 
5. If the monetary regime is to be Inflation Targeting, consider using as the target, in place 
of the standard CPI, a price measure that puts greater weight on the export commodity, 
such as an index of export prices or producer prices. 
6. Avoid excessive spending in boom times, allow deviations from a target surplus only in 
response to output gaps and long-lasting commodity price increases, as judged by 
independent panels of experts rather than politicians. 
7. Commodity Funds should be transparent and professionally run, with rules to govern the 
payout rate and with the insulation of the managers from political pressure in their pursuit 
of the financial well being of the country. 
8. When spending resource wealth, consider the lump-sum distribution on an equal per 
capita basis. 
9. An external agent could be mandated to provide transparency and to freeze accounts in 
the event of a coup. 
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